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ABSTRACT 
This paper focuses on the share and incidence of nominal and real wages cuts in the 
Finnish private sector. It complements other analyses of downward wage rigidities 
especially by looking for individual and employer characteristics that might explain the 
likelihood of observing an individual’s wage cut. The examinations are based on Probit 
models that include individual characteristics, employer characteristics, and the form of 
remuneration as explanatory variables. We find relatively few individual or employer 
characteristics that have a strong and common influence on the likelihood of wage 
decline across the different segments of labour markets. However, the full-time workers 
have had a lower likelihood of nominal and real wage declines during the 1990s 
compared with part-time workers. Declines in wages have also been more common in 
small plants/firms. In addition, nominal wage declines have been more transitory by their 
nature within the segments of the Finnish labour markets in which they are more 
common. Overall, the frequency of nominal wage declines has been fairly low for 
manufacturing non-manuals and service sector workers but somewhat higher for manual 
workers in manufacturing. However, nominal wage moderation together with a positive 
inflation rate produced real wage cuts for a large proportion of employees during the 
worst recession years of the early 1990s. 
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I. Introduction 
 
This study considers the incidence of wage cuts across individuals. Wage changes in 
labour markets without frictions for adjustment can be described by the mean change. In 
practice, the mean change is not able to capture all relevant aspects in wage changes. The 
reason is that wage distributions fail to be symmetric around the mean change that 
fluctuates over time, because there are obstacles for wage changes. The aim of this study 
is to investigate the number of wage cuts in different segments of labour markets and, in 
particular, to shed light on individual and employer characteristics and the forms of 
remuneration that account for wage cuts. In this respect, there may be characteristics that 
have a similar influence on the likelihood of wage cuts in different segments of labour 
markets. In terms of the nature of wage cuts, the amount of their persistence is an 
important issue for individuals. These questions can be addressed by using micro-level 
data on wages.    
 
The incidence of wage cuts in Finland during the 1990s is interesting.1 The prominent 
reason for this is that the economic experience has been dramatic by any reasonable 
standards. Finland suffered its worst recession of the twentieth century not in the 1930s 
but in the early 1990s (see, for example, Kiander and Vartia 1996; Honkapohja and 
Koskela 1999; Böckerman and Kiander 2002). As a consequence of the slump, output fell 
by 10% in the years 1991-1993. The rate of unemployment surged correspondingly from 
                                                          
1 Vartiainen (1998) contains a description of the Finnish labour markets. Koskela and Uusitalo (2003) 
provides a discussion of the Finnish unemployment problem in the European context. 
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3.5% to almost 20%. These indicators were much worse than those recorded during the 
great depression of the 1930s. Since 1994 the economy has recovered. 
 
Despite the collapse in labour demand, there were no overall cuts in the aggregate 
nominal wages during the great slump according to commonly used earnings indices. 
There was, however, significant nominal wage moderation through the use of the 
instruments of the centralized bargaining system at the same time. Nominal wages were 
frozen by the collective agreements over the period 1992-1993. However, the rate of 
inflation was slower than expected and there was a continuation of a small but positive 
wage drift. This meant that aggregate real wages remained more or less unchanged in 
1992-1994. This macroeconomic pattern of non-adjustment can be contrasted to the 
micro-level dynamics of individual wages during this turbulent decade.2  
 
The rest of the study is organized as follows. The second section provides brief 
theoretical considerations on the incidence of wage cuts across individuals. The third 
section contains information about the data. The fourth section includes a description of 
the heterogeneity of individual-level wage changes by documenting the amount of 
negative wage changes. The fifth section reports the estimation results. These estimations 
                                                          
2 The previous Finnish studies have usually applied aggregate data (see, for example, Pehkonen 1999). An 
empirical investigation by Vartiainen (2000) that applies data on manual workers in Finnish manufacturing 
is an exception to this pattern. Kramarz (2001) provides a survey of the literature that has focused on the 
micro-level adjustment of nominal wages. Agell and Lundborg (2003) provide Swedish evidence based on 
survey data for the perspective that there has not been increase in wage cuts in Sweden despite the rise in 
the unemployment rate during the 1990s. Christofides and Stengos (2003) investigate the factors that have 
an influence on the likelihood of pay increases with Canadian individual-level wage data. However, they 
focus on macro-economic variables. They observe, among other things, that an increase in the regional 
unemployment rate yields a decline in the likelihood of a wage increase for individuals.    
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provide information about the factors that did have an influence on the incidence of the 
burden of adjustment in terms of wage cuts across individuals. The last section concludes. 
 
II. Theoretical considerations 
 
Efficiency wages and fairness standards are the most prominent explanations for the lack 
of wage cuts. An established version of the efficiency-wage theory states that real wage 
cuts should be less likely for the categories of the labour force that are most important for 
the productivity of a firm. The reason is that declines in real wages may yield outflow of 
these key categories of workers and therefore hurt the productivity and the profitability of 
a firm (see, for example, Yellen 1984). The mutual resistance for wage cuts by employees 
and employers can also arise from the fairness standards (see, for example, Solow 1990; 
Fehr and Gächter 2000; Akerlof 2002; Bewley 2002). The fairness standards constitute 
obstacles directly to nominal wage declines as well as real wages. Fairness standards 
should be looser, for instance, for young employees, owing to a short history of repeated 
interactions between the worker and the firm (see, for example, Fehr and Goette 2000). 
This means that employers may not feel to be constrained by the fairness standards in 
order to impose wage cuts for young employees that have not yet established their labour 
market positions within the firms. Another argument is related to the stylized feature that 
a decline in wages increases the likelihood that a worker will quit from the current match. 
However, there is less accumulated firm-specific investments for young employees (see, 
for example, Holden 1984; Malcomson 1997; 1998). Declines in wages can therefore be 
implemented for young employees without nullification of sunk costs associated with 
these firm-specific investments.  
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These theoretical explanations are also relevant to other characteristics of individuals and 
firms, like experience, gender, length of working hours and firm size. The importance of 
different motives for wage rigidity may, of course, vary across labour market segments. 
Furthermore, there may be other explanatory factors, such as institutional constraints, that 
affect our results for wage cuts. These issues are further discussed in connection with 
empirical results. 
 
III.         The data 
 
The data of this study comes directly from the payroll records of the Finnish employers’ 
organizations, covering all employees of their member firms3. The structure of this data is 
quite similar across sectors. It provides detailed information about wages and employees’ 
individual characteristics (such as age and gender). The data used here, due to its origin in 
the employers’ payroll records, is considered to be very accurate by its nature. This 
means that measurement error should not be a great problem in this data.4 However, there 
are two major differences in this data across the segments of the Finnish economy: the 
timing and the wage concept. The data for manual workers in manufacturing covers the 
last quarter of each year. In contrast, the data for non-manual workers in manufacturing 
covers one month of each year and the same feature extends to data that covers the 
private service sector. In addition, the applied wage concept differs across segments. The 
“average hourly wage for regular hours” measure for manual workers in manufacturing is 
widely held as the most appropriate wage measure, as it gives the average earnings per 
hour during regular working time excluding separate bonuses for overtime, shift work or 
                                                          
3 The data therefore covers almost comprehensively all workers in manufacturing and services in Finland. 
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working conditions. For non-manual workers in manufacturing and for the service sector 
workers the applied wage concept is the “regular monthly wage”. The wage changes used 
in our analyses are constructed for job-stayers, that is, only workers who have the same 
employer and the same occupation during the two consecutive years are included.5 
Moreover, in order to control for the variation arising from changing working hours for 
non-manual manufacturing and service sector workers’ monthly wages, it is required that 
the “regular weekly hours” are same in both years.  
  
IV.        Heterogeneity in wage changes  
 
The descriptive statistics on wage declines is provided in Tables 1-2. There has been a 
great deal of heterogeneity in the adjustment of nominal wages across individuals during 
the 1990s in terms of the incidence of nominal wage decreases. In manufacturing there is 
evidently substantially more indication of nominal wage rigidity for non-manual workers 
than for manual workers. Thus, there have been few negative nominal wage changes for 
non-manual workers in manufacturing, even during the great slump of the early 1990s 
(although there were somewhat more negative wage changes after the worst recession 
years in 1993). This pattern is in sharp contrast to the adjustment of nominal wages for 
manual workers in manufacturing during the recession years, when the share of workers 
with negative wage changes was 17% in 1990-1991, 36% in 1991-1992 and 21% in 
1992-1993. However, in normal times the number of negative nominal wage changes for 
                                                                                                                                                                             
4 Smith (2000) provides a discussion about the measurement error in wage changes.  
5 The inclusion of movers across plants and occupations yields an increase in the dispersion of wage 
changes. This feature is as expected due to the fact that there are no limitations for wage changes of job 
movers in the institutional context of the Finnish labour markets. These results are available from the 
authors. 
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job-stayers is not particularly high in the Finnish case. The proportion of negative wage 
changes in Table 1 (for manual workers in manufacturing) has been around 5-10% in 
normal business cycle conditions, which is about half of the similar proportion in the UK 
(see Nickell and Quintini 2001). 
 
TABLES 1-2 AROUND HERE 
 
The share of nominal wage declines for job stayers in the service sector is small 
compared with manual workers in manufacturing but similar to non-manual workers in 
manufacturing. The share of real wage declines behaves more similarly across sectors, 
being very high (60-80%) during the recession years of 1991-1993. This arises from a 
large number of wage increases that lie between zero and the inflation rate. This holds in 
particular for the non-manual and service sector workers, which explains the larger 
difference between shares of real and nominal wage declines for these groups. 
 
The frequency of nominal and real wage cuts broken down by industry in each sector is 
presented in Figures 1 to 3. Although there are some differences between industries, the 
overall picture is that both the level and time series patterns of the shares of wage 
declines are quite similar across industries (with somewhat more differences in nominal 
wages in the service sector). This implies that the time series pattern of wage cuts is not 
related to industry specific factors and/or changes in industry structure of employment. 
 
FIGURES 1-3 AROUND HERE 
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The average nominal wage decline for those workers that experience a wage decline has 
been higher in the service sector compared with manual and non-manual workers in 
manufacturing. The same applies for average real wage declines comparing service sector 
and non-manuals, but not for manuals. Note that the average real wage decline is smaller 
than the average nominal wage decline, because the former contains a large number of 
small real declines. 
 
V.         Explaining the incidence of wage cuts  
 
Since we focus on the prevalence of nominal wage rigidity, we examine the existence of 
wage cuts rather than the size of wage declines. Hence, we use the Probit models to 
evaluate the factors that have contributed to the likelihood of wage declines for job 
stayers during the 1990s. The models include individual characteristics (such as age, 
experience, working hours, region and gender), employer characteristics (size, female 
share and industry), and the form of remuneration (as lagged share of performance pay 
and change in it) (see Appendix 1).6 The estimation results for wage declines covering 
manufacturing and the private service sector are reported in Tables 3-67. These models 
also include the year dummies that are not reported in order to save space, because they 
reveal the same broad pattern as the tables of the earlier section. This means that the 
background characteristics included do not explain the time-series pattern of wage 
declines. 
                                                          
6 The explanatory variables are from year t with the exception of the variables that captures lagged 
performance pay share and the lagged decline in wage. Those variables are from year t-1.  
7 The panel-property of the individual-level data with random effects turned out to be statistically 
insignicant in the determination of wage declines, so we report ordinary Probit results only. 
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 TABLES 3-6 AROUND HERE 
 
The role of workers’ age in the determination of wage declines during the 1990s is 
mixed. For manual workers in manufacturing, nominal wage declines have been less 
common for the population of young employees during the 1990s, which is in conflict 
with the notions based on fairness as an obstacle for nominal wage declines. Nominal 
wage declines are also less common for aged employees. This means that nominal wage 
declines have been more common for the prime-age workers (36 to 54 years of age), 
which is the reference group for the estimated age effects. This pattern is in disagreement 
with a number of popular notions about labour markets. The reason for the feature that 
nominal wage declines are less common for young employees is probably the fact that the 
payment system adopted by the Finnish manufacturing companies implies that there is 
usually a rather steep increase in the earnings profile for employees during their early 
years. For instance, young employees move quite rapidly from trainee positions to regular 
full-time jobs within manufacturing companies. In addition, wages for young employees 
in manufacturing are likely to be close to the minimum wages stipulated in the current 
collective agreements. This same pattern of adjustment applies to non-manual 
manufacturing workers. Thus, there fails to be room for nominal wage cuts for young 
employees in the institutional framework of the Finnish labour markets.  
 
Real wage declines for young manual and non-manual workers in manufacturing are also 
substantially less common than for prime-aged employees. In contrast to declines in 
nominal wages, cuts in real wages are slightly more common for the aged manual 
manufacturing workers. The pattern is the same, but stronger for non-manual 
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manufacturing workers. Thus, nominal wage increases for aged manual manufacturing 
workers tend to be more often above zero, but at the same time below the current rate of 
inflation, compared with other age groups. This feature is consistent with nominal wage 
rigidity as an obstacle to nominal wage cuts for aged manual employees, although their 
real wages may be cut. However, in quantitative terms these effects for older workers are 
quite small in manufacturing. In the service sector nominal wage declines are more 
common for young workers. However, real wage declines for young workers are 
substantially less likely compared with prime-aged and older workers, as in 
manufacturing. This pattern means that in services nominal wage declines are more 
common for young workers, but nominal pay increases that are below inflation are 
relatively less common for young workers compared to prime-aged and older workers. In 
contrast, declines in real wages are substantially more common for aged workers. In 
general these results indicate that the population of aged employees constitutes the most 
flexible part of labour force in terms of downward real wage adjustment both in 
manufacturing and service sectors. 
 
Experience provides an indicator of the attachment of workers to labour markets. 
Nominal and real wage declines are less common for less experienced manual workers 
that have a looser attachment to manufacturing plants. The findings for non-manual 
workers in manufacturing are mixed, because nominal wage cuts are less common for 
newcomers, but real wage cuts are actually more common for them. These findings are 
not consistent with the notions based on fairness, but they most likely reflect the same 
factors as for age above. Nominal wage declines are more common for the service sector 
workers that have a short tenure, whereas cuts in real wages are less common. All in all, 
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long attachment to the same firm does not provide a shield against negative real wage 
changes. 
 
Gender seems to matter for the incidence of wage declines. Both nominal and real wage 
declines are slightly less common for females. The reason for this is probably the fact that 
the labour supply responses for females are more flexible in terms of hours and numbers, 
implying less need for wage cuts. Nominal wage declines are more common for manual 
workers in manufacturing plants that have a large share of females. The same pattern 
applies to the service sector, but fails to apply to non-manual manufacturing workers. A 
possible explanation of this pattern is the low capital intensity of a plant that is associated 
with a high female share, which means that there is more overall need for the adjustment 
of labour costs. However, in manufacturing there is evidence that nominal and real wage 
declines are more common for those females that are employed in female-dominated 
plants. The pattern fails to extend to non-manual manufacturing workers. These effects 
for the female-dominated service sector are smaller and mixed for real and nominal 
wages in this respect. 
 
The hours of work play an important role in the incidence of wage declines. Declines in 
nominal and real wages are less common for employees that perform a great number of 
weekly working hours. These employees constitute the firm insiders that are largely 
shielded from wage cuts. This pattern is consistent with the efficiency-wage explanation 
and the fairness standards as an obstacle to wage cuts. A version of the efficiency-wage 
theory based on the worker turnover suggests that wage declines are avoided for the firm 
insiders, because they are more important for the productivity and the profitability of a 
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firm compared with the part-time workers. The fairness standards can also be more tight 
for the firm insiders. Additional estimation results that involved interactions of the 
explanatory variables with the years revealed that the influence of hours of work on the 
incidence of wage cuts across individuals was especially strong during the great slump of 
the early 1990s.8 For instance, contractions in real wages were over 10% more likely for 
manual workers in manufacturing that work less than 30 hours in 1994. In other words, 
nominal and real wage cuts have been more likely among part-time workers. The pattern 
extends to non-manual workers in manufacturing and the service sector. This means that 
there are certain common elements in the incidence of the burden of wage cuts across 
sectors.  
 
Overtime constitutes an important part of the adjustment of the total hours of work in 
manufacturing. Thus, for manual workers in manufacturing, there is strong evidence for 
the perspective that an increase in paid overtime hours yields a decrease in the likelihood 
of nominal wage decline. The reason is most likely that overtime captures the 
profitability of a plant that is not available in the wage records by employers. In other 
words, an increase in the profits of a plant means that there is more need for paid 
overtime and there fails to be a need for nominal wage cuts at the same time.9  
 
                                                          
8 These results are not shown in tables, but they are available upon request. 
 
9 This conclusion is based on the fact that overtime premia are high in Finland. The (minimum) premium 
for daily overtime is 50% for the first two hours and 100% for each following hour. The premium for 
weekly overtime is 50%, irrespective of the number of hours. 
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Regional disparities are sharp in Finland. The geographical pattern of wage cuts is 
therefore interesting. Nominal wage declines for manual and non-manual workers in 
manufacturing have been slightly more common in urban areas during the 1990s. This 
particular pattern is not consistent with the stylized feature that urban areas are, in broad 
terms, characterized by the lower level of the unemployment rate compared with the rest 
of the Finnish regions. Thus, there should be fewer pressures for wage cuts in the 
population of manufacturing plants that are located in those regions. An explanation for 
the pattern that wage declines are more common in manufacturing in urban areas may be 
that these regional labour markets are more dynamic by their nature in the sense that 
temporary pay rises are followed by temporary declines in wages. However, in the 
service sector declines in nominal wages are less common in urban areas, but in real 
wages this effect is insignificant. 
  
Nominal and real wage cuts are more common in small plants. The size effect is robust 
across sectors. The size of a plant measured by the number of employees can matter for 
wage cuts for several reasons. There is more need for wage cuts in small plants, because 
they face more volatility from product markets and for that reason there is more need for 
the adjustment of labour costs among small plants (see, for example, Caves 1998). An 
additional explanation for the fact that wage declines are more common in small firms is 
that there is almost always a low hierarchy in small firms compared with large companies 
with a great number of separate establishments, which facilitates a more efficient and 
detailed flow of information about the position of firms in the population of small firms. 
As a consequence of this, workers are more informed about the financial situation of a 
firm and they are therefore more willing to make sacrifices in terms of wage cuts in order 
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to preserve the continuity of a firm’s operations. However, the pattern that wage cuts are 
more common in small plants is in disagreement with the notions based on fairness as an 
obstacle to nominal wage declines, because fairness standards should be stricter in small 
plants due to the fact that there is more need for repeated personal interactions in small 
plants between employer and employees.  
 
The regular wage of workers consists of several components that have a different 
exposure to the performance of an employer. For manual and non-manual workers in 
manufacturing, the lagged performance-related pay share variable gets a positive sign and 
the effect is substantial by its magnitude. This means that those employees that have a 
great deal of volatile components in their regular wage have a substantially higher 
likelihood to experience nominal and real wage decline. The same pattern exists for the 
service sector workers. In contrast, the variable that captures the change in the 
performance-related pay share decreases the likelihood of a wage decline for manual 
workers in manufacturing. There are at least two explanations for this pattern. First, the 
performance-related pay rates are higher than the pay rates for time pay. Thus, a decline 
in the regular hourly wage is less likely as the share of these wage components with the 
higher average rates increases. Second, manual workers in manufacturing may supply 
more performance-related hours in order to resist declines in time wages. This reduces 
the likelihood of declines in total wages, but creates a positive correlation between 
declines in time wages and the performance pay share, as found in the model for time 
wages in contrast to the negative effect on regular wage (in Tables 3-4). The findings for 
non-manual manufacturing workers and for service sector workers reveal the opposite 
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pattern. A possible explanation for this is that service sector workers are not able to resist 
declines in wages by increasing the supply of performance-related hours.  
 
Unskilled workers have a higher likelihood of nominal and real wage decline in the 
service sector.10 This means that education is somewhat helpful in avoiding wage decline. 
Efficiency-wages may explain this pattern. Nominal and real wage cuts are not easily 
implemented for skilled workers, because they are more important for the productivity 
and the profitability of a firm compared with unskilled workers. There is therefore some 
evidence for the perspective that unskilled workers carried the heaviest burden of 
depression in both prices and quantities, because the net rate of employment change was 
the most negative for the employees with basic education only during the great slump of 
the early 1990s. However, for non-manual manufacturing workers there is some evidence 
for a small negative or insignificant effect of education on wage cuts. All in all, education 
effects are quite small and different across sectors. 
 
An important feature of wage declines is their persistence for individuals. The negative 
welfare effects of wage declines in terms of lost labour income are highlighted if wage 
declines are strongly persistent in time. We find empirical evidence for a transitory 
component in nominal and real wage declines. For instance, in the case of nominal wages 
a decline in a wage is 5% less common for a manual worker who has experienced a 
                                                          
10 This particular variable is not available for manual manufacturing workers. However, it can be argued 
that education is not important in the incidence of wage cuts across individuals in manufacturing owing to 
the homogeneity of the labour force. In contrast, the Finnish private service sector is more heterogenous in 
terms of education requirements of workers, because it contains firms from pharmacies with academic 
education requirements to restaurants with few requirements for formal education.   
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nominal wage cut during the previous year, other things being equal. In contrast, there is 
some persistence in nominal wage declines for non-manual manufacturing workers, but 
the share of workers experiencing nominal wage cuts is small in this segment. Nominal 
wage declines for service sector workers show stronger persistence, but nominal wage 
cuts are quite rare also in this sector. However, the effect of lagged decline on the 
likelihood of real wage decline is again negative for non-manual manufacturing workers 
and for service sector workers, similar to manual workers. Thus, we find evidence for an 
important transitory component in the likelihood of real wage decline for all sectors and 
worker groups. 
 
VI.        Conclusions 
 
There has been a great deal of heterogeneity in wage cuts for job stayers in Finland 
during the 1990s. The frequency of nominal wage declines has been highest for manual 
workers in manufacturing. In contrast, there has been a substantially lower number of 
negative nominal wage changes for non-manual workers in manufacturing and for service 
sector workers. Nominal wage moderation with the positive inflation rate during the great 
slump of the early 1990s made it possible to implement real wage cuts for a large 
proportion of employees without implementing aggregate nominal wage cuts by the 
collective agreements. In this sense, centralized bargaining shaped the adjustment. 
 
There are relatively few factors that have a common influence on the likelihood of wage 
decline across the segments of the Finnish economy. However, the hours of work and the 
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size of a plant/firm play a similar role in the incidence of wage cuts. Full-time workers, 
who constitute the firm insiders, have a lower likelihood of nominal and real wage 
decline. Moreover, nominal and real wage declines tend to be more common in small 
plants, where there is perhaps more need for the adjustment of labour costs due to product 
market effects. There is some evidence for nominal wage rigidity to play a role in 
nominal wage cuts. For example, nominal wage increases among the population of aged 
manual employees in manufacturing tend to be constrained above zero, but at the same 
time they may be less than the current rate of inflation producing declines in real wages.  
 
The persistence of wage cuts shows interesting differences across the segments of the 
Finnish labour markets. Nominal wage declines are more transitory by their nature within 
the segments in which they are more common. In other words, nominal wage declines 
have been more common for manual workers in manufacturing during the 1990s, but they 
have been more transitory by their nature. In contrast, for non-manual workers in 
manufacturing and for service sector workers, declines in nominal wages have been less 
common by their frequency, but they have been more persistent than for manual workers.  
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Table 1. Proportion of employees that have experienced negative wage changes  
              across sectors of the Finnish economy during the 1990s. 
 
 
 Nominal wage Real Wage 
      Manufacturing Manufacturing Services Manufacturing Manufacturing Services
 Manual workers Non-manual workers 
Hourly pay Monthly pay 
 
Monthly pay 
Manual workers 
Hourly pay 
Non-manual workers 
Monthly pay 
 
Monthly pay 
1990-1991 16.9      2.0 2.4 60.1 47.8 20.8
1991-1992   36.4 2.7 5.4 69.5 87.2 81.5 
1992-1993  20.6      5.4 3.9 57.8 74.4 83.1
1993-1994   8.4 1.4 4.7 11.8 14.5 69.8 
1994-1995    5.0 1.2 2.7 6.5 2.3  4.2 
1995-1996     10.4 3.3 2.8 12.3 4.8  4.0 
1996-1997   23.3 2.7 4.8 48.2 61.3 74.3 
1997-1998  11.4       1.3 3.4 18.7 6.4 5.7
1998-1999   11.4 3.5 3.9 17.5 7.6  6.1 
1999-2000    6.8 1.6 3.4 33.7 34.9 38.6 
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Table 2. The average wage decline for those employees that have experienced negative wage changes  
              across sectors of the Finnish economy during the 1990s. 
 
 
 Nominal wage Real Wage 
      Manufacturing Manufacturing Services Manufacturing Manufacturing Services
 Manual workers Non-manual workers 
Hourly pay Monthly pay 
 
Monthly pay 
Manual workers 
Hourly pay 
Non-manual workers 
Monthly pay 
 
Monthly pay 
1990-1991 -5.4      -8.2 -15.4 -4.0 -2.1 -3.5
1991-1992   -3.5 -7.2 -8.6 -3.9 -2.6 -2.8 
1992-1993  -3.8      -6.6 -12.0 -2.9 -2.2 -2.6
1993-1994   -5.7 -9.3 -11.8 -5.0 -1.7 -1.9 
1994-1995    -5.8 -19.3 -13.5 -5.3 -11.6 -9.6 
1995-1996     -5.0 -6.7 -13.4 -4.8 -5.2 -10.0 
1996-1997   -2.9 -9.2 -9.7 -2.4 -1.6 -1.8 
1997-1998  -4.6      -10.1 -10.7 -3.9 -3.4 -7.6
1998-1999   -4.7 -7.7 -11.2 -4.0 -4.6 -8.2 
1999-2000    -5.2 -11.6 -12.8 -2.5 -1.2 -2.0 
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Table 3. Probit models for nominal wage cuts of manual workers in manufacturing.  
             (dependent variable indicates decline in nominal wage between t and t-1)  
 
Manual Workers  Manual Workers  
Regular hourly (total) pay  Hourly pay for time work 
 
 
  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  
Lag decline -0.047  -(52.11) -0.045 -(50.54) -0.051 -(48.06) -0.050 -(46.67)  
Young (≤25) -0.011   
   
   
         
 
   
  
   
  
   
  
  
  
   
   
   
  
  
 
-(5.95) -0.010 -(5.51) -0.011 -(7.13) -0.015 -(7.32) -0.015 -(6.80) -0.016 -(9.31)
Adult (26-35) 0.000 -(0.43) 0.000 (0.13) 0.000 -(0.42) -0.002 -(2.34) -0.002 -(1.64) -0.002 -(2.43)
Old (>55) -0.003
 
-(2.41) -0.003 -(2.18) -0.004 -(2.87) -0.001 -(0.76) -0.001 -(0.60) -0.003 -(1.96)
Experience ≤2 dropped dropped
 
dropped dropped -0.030 -(15.68) dropped
 
dropped dropped dropped -0.028 -(13.48)
Experience 3-4 -0.011 -(7.06) -0.011 -(7.10) -0.007 -(5.47) -0.010 -(6.00) -0.011 -(6.27) -0.010 -(7.12)
Experience 5-7 -0.001 -(0.76) 0.000 -(0.10) 0.001 (1.22) -0.001 -(1.09) -0.002 -(1.22) -0.001 -(1.16)
Weekly hours <30 0.021 (22.28) 0.020 (21.63) 0.023 (28.92) 0.019 (16.60) 0.017 (14.75) 0.020 (20.49) 
Weekly hours >40 0.003 (2.76) 0.002 (2.04) 0.003 (3.57) -0.002 -(1.98) -0.004 -(3.46) -0.002 -(1.98)
Overtime work -0.014 -(18.69) -0.014 -(19.04) -0.015 -(22.55) -0.006 -(6.74) -0.006 -(6.29) -0.007 -(9.12) 
Urban area 0.008 (9.97) 0.008 (9.79) 0.008 (10.41) 0.008 (8.36) 0.008 (8.09) 0.007 (8.64)
Small firm (<20) 0.031 (9.14) 0.031 (9.13) 0.026 (9.19) 0.035 (10.03) 0.033 (9.44) 0.030 (10.39) 
Large firm (>100) -0.021 -(19.53) -0.021 -(19.68) -0.021 -(22.43) -0.009 -(7.80) -0.009 -(8.21) -0.009 -(9.30) 
Female -0.035 -(18.66) -0.037 -(19.58) -0.040 -(23.27) -0.022 -(8.76) -0.024 -(9.26) -0.026 -(11.38) 
Fem share (>med) 0.016 (17.44) 0.019 (20.32) 0.014 (16.93) 0.007 (6.14) 0.009 (7.79) 0.010 (10.29)
Fem*Femsh inter. 0.042 (17.85) 0.045 (18.76) 0.045 (20.61) 0.024 (7.83) 0.026 (8.46) 0.025 (9.21)
Industry change -0.017 -(0.25) -0.056 -(3.49) -0.059 -(3.77) -0.106 -(7.58) -0.061 -(2.39) -0.070 -(2.90)
∆Perf.pay share -0.120 -(69.11) -0.122 -(69.86) -0.133 -(88.30) 0.064 (28.68) 0.063 (27.42) 0.054 (29.11) 
Lag Perf.pay share 0.081 (97.76) 0.081 (97.80) 0.084 (112.43) 0.161 (132.58) 0.162 (131.42) 0.159 (151.50) 
Year*Industry        YES  NO  NO         YES  NO  NO  
Year*Ind.change        YES  
 
NO  NO         YES  NO  NO  
Number of obs. 941039 941048 1160377  560467 560677 735621
Pseudo R2 0.135  
      
  
  
0.122 0.114  0.171 0.155 0.141
Log-likelihood -351205.2 -356411.8 -441972.3 -193813.7 -197608.1 -260954.4
Obs. P 0.155 0.155 0.154  0.147 0.147 0.144
Pred. P 0.123 0.126 0.127  0.106 0.110 0.111
Notes: The marginal effects (and t-values) are reported. All models include year and industry dummies. Base groups (omitted indicators) are 
prime aged (36-55), experience > 7 years, weekly hours 30-40, no overtime hours, non-urban area, medium sized firm (20-100 employees), male, 
female share less than median share, no industry change. Experience ≤2 group dropped because it is impossible in models including lagged 
decline as an explanatory variable (requires three observations). 
 22
Table 4. Probit models for real wage cuts of manual workers in manufacturing.  
             (dependent variable indicates decline in real wage between t and t-1)  
 
Manual Workers  Manual Workers  
Regular hourly (total) pay  Hourly pay for time work 
 
 
  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  
Lag decline -0.084  -(69.84) -0.085 -(71.08) -0.084 -(50.25) -0.086 -(51.98)  
Young (≤25) -0.056  
  
   
         
  
  
   
   
  
   
  
  
  
  
   
   
 
  
 
-(20.48) -0.054 -(19.81) -0.058 -(26.25) -0.076 -(22.35) -0.073 -(21.30) -0.079 -(28.84) 
Adult (26-35) -0.023 -(17.74) -0.022 -(16.71) -0.025 -(20.98) -0.036 -(20.91) -0.034 -(19.65) -0.036 -(23.93) 
Old (>55) 0.005
 
(2.67) 0.005 (2.38) 0.007 (3.60) 0.011 (4.20) 0.011 (4.06) 0.011 (4.68)
Experience ≤2 dropped dropped dropped dropped -0.113 -(40.92) dropped dropped dropped dropped -0.120 -(36.12)
Experience 3-4 -0.050 -(22.14) -0.050 -(21.99) -0.047 -(24.02) -0.058 -(20.49) -0.060 -(20.97) -0.055 -(23.15) 
Experience 5-7 -0.021 -(12.00) -0.019 -(11.00) -0.015 -(9.96) -0.021 -(9.55) -0.021 -(9.47) -0.018 -(9.14) 
Weekly hours <30 0.018 (13.30) 0.025 (19.02) 0.030 (25.23) 0.015 (8.00) 0.016 (8.76) 0.023 (14.70)
Weekly hours >40 0.001 (0.74) 0.002 (1.60) 0.001 (0.90) -0.005 -(2.55) -0.004 -(2.34) -0.004 -(2.24)
Overtime work -0.026 -(23.74) -0.026 -(24.38) -0.028 -(28.13) -0.022 -(15.29) -0.023 -(15.87) -0.027 -(21.15) 
Urban area 0.006 (5.00) 0.005 (4.38) 0.005 (4.52) 0.007 (4.89) 0.006 (3.83) 0.005 (3.57)
Small firm (<20) 0.043 (8.39) 0.043 (8.71) 0.053 (12.39) 0.036 (6.37) 0.032 (5.95) 0.048 (10.47) 
Large firm (>100) -0.033 -(20.97) -0.034 -(21.69) -0.037 -(26.27) -0.030 -(16.39) -0.031 -(17.30) -0.036 -(22.45) 
Female -0.036 -(13.72) -0.040 -(14.91) -0.042 -(16.52) -0.027 -(6.97) -0.029 -(7.41) -0.029 -(8.39) 
Fem share (>med) 0.025 (18.54) 0.027 (20.32) 0.028 (22.58) -0.002 -(0.86) 0.000 (0.20) 0.010 (6.23) 
Fem*Femsh inter. 0.034 (10.83) 0.038 (12.08) 0.031 (10.74) 0.023 (5.16) 0.026 (5.83) 0.019 (4.85)
Industry change -0.045 -(0.56) -0.126 -(4.65) -0.131 -(4.58) -0.162 -(2.15) -0.102 -(2.17) -0.117 -(2.43)
∆Perf.pay share -0.211 -(80.82) -0.212 -(81.26) -0.242 -(103.13) 0.028 (7.30) 0.024 (5.99) 0.018 (5.50) 
Lag Perf.pay share 0.029 (24.21) 0.028 (23.89) 0.023 (20.97) 0.071 (34.89) 0.067 (32.69) 0.045 (25.06) 
Year*Industry        YES  NO  NO      YES  NO  NO  
Year*Ind.change        YES  
 
NO  NO      YES  NO  NO  
Number of obs. 941037 941048 1160377  560467 560677 735621
Pseudo R2 0.226  
      
  
  
0.209 0.208  0.291 0.274 0.253
Log-likelihood -457789.4 -467893.4 -593485.8 -252885.7 -258909.3 -358732.6
Obs. P 0.322 0.322 0.347  0.333 0.333 0.358
Pred. P 0.279 0.282 0.308  0.276 0.282 0.312
Notes: as in Table 3. 
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Table 5. Probit models for nominal wage cuts of service sector workers and non-manual workers in manufacturing.  
             (dependent variable indicates decline in nominal wage between t and t-1)  
 
Service sector Workers   Non-Manual Workers (manufacturing)  
Monthly pay  Monthly pay  
   
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  
Lag decline 0.040   (39.88) 0.041 (39.86) 0.003 (5.89) 0.003 (4.70)
Young (≤25) 0.009   
  
   
  
   
   
  
   
   
  
  
   
   
  
  
  
  
 
(8.14) 0.010 (8.46) 0.009 (10.75) -0.007 -(5.96) -0.008 -(6.24) -0.008 -(9.67)
Adult (26-35) 0.000 (0.27) 0.000 (0.13) 0.000 -(0.14) -0.004 -(10.94) -0.004 -(10.76) -0.004 -(11.98) 
Old (>55) -0.003 -(4.88) -0.003 -(4.48) -0.003 -(5.10) 0.002 (4.92) 0.002 (4.58) 0.002 (3.69)
Tenure ≤2 0.008 (9.67) 0.008 (9.98) 0.011 (18.56) -0.002 -(5.03) -0.003 -(6.38) -0.004 -(10.03) 
Tenure 3-4 0.002 (2.83) 0.001 (2.27) 0.003 (4.96) -0.002 -(3.87) -0.003 -(7-04) -0.003 -(6.80)
Tenure 5-7 0.002 (2.80) 0.001 (2.42) 0.002 (4.22) -0.001 -(2.59) -0.001 -(3.41) -0.001 -(2.72)
Weekly hours <30* 0.043 (31.40) 0.043 (31.21) 0.071 (56.32) 0.010 (9.90) 0.011 (10.21) 0.010 (10.66) 
Urban area -0.005 -(10.28) -0.005 -(10.17) -0.005 -(12.93) 0.001 (2.74) 0.000 (1.33) 0.000 -(0.32)
Small firm (<20) 0.005 (6.63) 0.005 (6.83) 0.005 (7.71) 0.003 (5.55) 0.003 (5.27) 0.004 (9.02)
Large firm (>100) -0.005 -(8.28) -0.005 -(8.66) -0.005 -(10.49) -0.005 -(14.49) -0.004 -(12.17) -0.004 -(11.76) 
Female -0.011 -(19.08) -0.011 -(19.00) -0.011 -(21.60) -0.004 -(8.77) -0.004 -(7.81) -0.004 -(9.79) 
Fem share (>med) 0.005 (5.35) 0.005 (5.40) 0.006 (7.14) 0.001 (1.58) 0.000 (0.32) 0.000 (0.57)
Fem*Femsh inter. 0.006 (5.79) 0.006 (5.64) 0.006 (7.20) 0.003 (4.78) 0.003 (4.65) 0.003 (4.90)
Unskilled 0.005 (10.79) 0.005 (10.37) 0.004 (10.64) -0.001 -(3.17) -0.001 -(3.02) -0.001 -(4.37) 
Industry change -0.025 -(4.93) 0.016 (13.45) 0.014 (12.18) -0.010 -(1.31) -0.013 -(18.30) -0.013 -(18.63) 
∆Perf.pay share 0.189 (39.39) 0.194 (39.78) 0.204 (51.25) 0.195 (71.96) 0.230 (76.54) 0.253 (98.03) 
Lag Perf.pay share 0.007 (2.01) 0.008 (2.50) 0.016 (5.72) 0.051 (26.83) 0.052 (24.10) 0.053 (27.41) 
Year*Industry        YES  NO  NO         YES  NO  NO  
Year*Ind.change        YES  
 
NO  NO         YES  NO  NO  
Number of obs. 774914 774914 994539  650709 655653 858772
Pseudo R2 0.057  
      
  
  
0.050 0.055  0.208 0.137 0.131
Log-likelihood -115439.9 -116203.4 -151372.4 -61348.2 -66980.6 -86327.8
Obs. P 0.037 0.037 0.038  0.026 0.025 0.025
Pred. P 0.031 0.032 0.032  0.013 0.015 0.015
Notes: The marginal effects (and t-values) are reported. All models include year and industry dummies. Base groups (omitted indicators) are 
prime aged (36-55), tenure/experience > 7 years, weekly hours over 30 (35 for non-manuals), no overtime hours, non-urban area, medium sized 
firm (20-100 employees), male, female share less than median share, skilled worker (more than basic education), no industry change.  
* The cut off point is 35 hours for non-manuals. 
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Table 6. Probit models for real wage cuts of service sector workers and non-manual workers in manufacturing.  
             (dependent variable indicates decline in real wage between t and t-1)  
 
Dependent variable: Real wage decline   
Service sector Workers   Non-Manual Workers (manufacturing)  
Monthly pay  Monthly pay  
   
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  
Lag decline -0.066  -(31.74) -0.063 -(31.80) -0.053 -(29.56) -0.055 -(30.11)  
Young (≤25) -0.167  
  
  
  
  
  
   
  
   
  
  
   
   
  
  
  
  
 
-(46.60) -0.163 -(45.77) -0.146 -(56.17) -0.131 -(27.39) -0.146 -(28.04) -0.154 -(46.02) 
Adult (26-35) -0.117 -(66.34) -0.116 -(66.64) -0.101 -(69.81) -0.099 -(63.48) -0.099 -(60.19) -0.095 -(68.52) 
Old (>55) 0.062 (22.71) 0.062 (23.02) 0.046 (19.76) 0.059 (24.31) 0.059 (23.78) 0.051 (23.22) 
Tenure ≤2 -0.055 -(20.06) -0.053 -(19.30) -0.039 -(20.12) -0.052 -(23.43) -0.053 -(22.56) -0.049 -(27.74) 
Tenure 3-4 -0.051 -(23.33) -0.042 -(19.42) -0.030 -(16.05) -0.037 -(18.42) -0.044 -(21.16) -0.030 -(16.24) 
Tenure 5-7 -0.043 -(20.60) -0.042 -(20.25) -0.031 -(17.64) -0.015 -(7.70) -0.014 -(6.86) -0.006 -(3.29) 
Weekly hours <30 0.093 (20.61) 0.063 (14.38) 0.072 (20.56) 0.030 (6.67) 0.033 (7.01) 0.010 (2.48)
Urban area -0.001 -(0.68) -0.002 -(1.47) 0.008 (5.69) 0.020 (14.24) 0.021 (14.59) 0.022 (18.32) 
Small firm (<20) 0.019 (6.49) 0.017 (5.92) 0.016 (7.04) 0.013 (5.15) 0.014 (5.48) 0.017 (8.02)
Large firm (>100) -0.026 -(12.80) -0.031 -(15.30) -0.033 -(20.31) -0.040 -(25.22) -0.036 -(22.54) -0.028 -(20.80) 
Female -0.019 -(9.18) -0.017 -(8.23) -0.031 -(18.24) -0.010 -(4.99) -0.007 -(3.28) -0.004 -(1.92) 
Fem share (>med) 0.009 (2.82) 0.003 (0.96) -0.002 -(0.67) 0.003 (1.78) -0.001 -(0.47) 0.004 (2.67)
Fem*Femsh inter. -0.015 -(4.06) -0.015 -(4.25) -0.013 -(4.39) -0.006 -(2.20) -0.005 -(1.83) -0.009 -(3.70)
Unskilled 0.024 (14.77) 0.020 (12.85) 0.011 (8.09) 0.002 (0.87) 0.000 (0.07) -0.008 -(5.15) 
Industry change -0.026 -(2.00) -0.092 -(23.86) -0.080 -(21.85) 0.080 (2.16) -0.119 -(18.93) -0.115 -(19.17) 
∆Perf.pay share 0.537 (25.34) 0.524 (24.83) 0.483 (29.01) 0.695 (40.62) 0.757 (42.91) 0.794 (52.18) 
Lag Perf.pay share 0.026 (2.07) 0.054 (4.31) 0.180 (18.27) -0.118 -(10.02) -0.128 -(10.47) -0.046 -(4.28) 
Year*Industry        YES  NO  NO         YES  NO  NO  
Year*Ind.change        YES  
 
NO  NO         YES  NO  NO  
Number of obs. 774914 774914 994539  654268 655653 858772
Pseudo R2 0.466  
      
  
  
0.446 0.410  0.446 0.406 0.362
Log-likelihood -283245.0 -293766.0 -395805.5 -228872.9 -245802.9 -346964.6
Obs. P 0.435 0.435 0.404  0.323 0.326 0.329
Pred. P 0.359 0.361 0.335  0.214 0.244 0.250
Notes: same as in Table 5. 
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Figure 1. Share of Nominal and Real Wage Declines for Manufacturing Manual Workers  
               (reqular hourly total pay) 
 
0
.2
.4
.6
0
.2
.4
.6
0
.2
.4
.6
0
.2
.4
.6
0
.2
.4
.6
1990 1995 2000 1990 1995 2000 1990 1995 2000 1990 1995 2000
1990 1995 2000 1990 1995 2000
4 5 8 19 21 22
24 27 28 30 33 34
35 43 51 52 67 68
69 72 78 81 83 84
86 87
(m
ea
n)
 d
ec
lin
e
vuosi
Graphs by tilryh
Share of Nominal Wage declines by Industry, Manufacturing Manual
 
0
.5
1
0
.5
1
0
.5
1
0
.5
1
0
.5
1
1990 1995 2000 1990 1995 2000 1990 1995 2000 1990 1995 2000
1990 1995 2000 1990 1995 2000
4 5 8 19 21 22
24 27 28 30 33 34
35 43 51 52 67 68
69 72 78 81 83 84
86 87
(m
ea
n)
 rd
ec
lin
e
vuosi
Graphs by tilryh
Share of Real Wage declines by Industry, Manufacturing Manual
 
 
 26
Figure 2. Share of Nominal and Real Wage Declines for Manufacturing Non-Manual Workers  
               (reqular monthly pay) 
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Figure 3. Share of Nominal and Real Wage Declines for Private Service Sector Workers  
               (reqular monthly pay) 
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Appendix 1. Description of the variables. 
 
Variable Definition/measurement  
  
Lag decline Individual has experienced a decline in wage in previous year=1, otherwise 0 
Young (≤25) Age of an individual is less than or equal to 25=1, otherwise 0 
Adult (26-35) Age of an individual is between 26-35=1, otherwise 0 
Old (>55) Age of an individual is older than 55=1, otherwise 0 
Experience ≤2 Experience of an individual within manufacturing industries is less than or equal to 2 years =1, otherwise 0  
Experience 3-4 Experience of an individual within manufacturing industries is between 3-4 years=1, otherwise 0 
Experience 5-7 Experience of an individual within manufacturing industries is between 5-7 years=1, otherwise 0 
Tenure ≤2 Tenure of an individual with the current employer in the service sector is less than or equal to 2 years =1, otherwise 0 
Tenure 3-4 Tenure of an individual with the current employer in the service sector is between 3-4 years =1, otherwise 0 
Tenure 5-7 Tenure of an individual with the current employer in the service sector is between 5-7 years =1, otherwise 0 
Weekly hours <30 Weekly working hours are less than 30 hours=1, otherwise 0 (cut off point is 35 hours for non-manuals) 
Weekly hours >40 Weekly working hours are more than 40 hours=1, otherwise 0 
Overtime work Manual manufacturing worker has worked paid overtime=1, otherwise 0  
Urban area Individual is living in a high price level urban area in Southern Finland=1, otherwise 0 
Small firm (<20) Individual is working in a small firm that employs less than 20 employees=1, otherwise 0 
Large firm (>100) Individual is working in a large firm that employs more than 100 employees=1, otherwise 0 
Female 1=female, 0=male 
Fem share (>med) Share of females in a firm is more than median share in that particular industry and year=1, otherwise 0 
Fem*Femsh inter. Individual is a female working in an above median female-share firm in that particular industry and year=1, otherwise 0 
Unskilled  Individual has basic education only=1, otherwise 0 (for non-manual manufacturing workers and service sector workers only) 
Industry change Individual’s employer firm’s industry changes from previous year =1, otherwise 0 
∆Perf.pay share Change in performance pay share. Performance pay includes compensation based on piece rates and/or other forms of 
remuneration that depend on individual’s performance.  
Lag Perf.pay share Lagged performance pay share 
INDUSTRY Dummies based on the collective agreement that the person is subject to. These are close to industries. 
YEARS Dummies for years of observation from 1991 to 2000  
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